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Cyber-Coolies and Techno-Braceros:
Race and Commodification of Indian
Information Technology Guest
Workers in the United States
By SHARMILA RUDRAPPA*
Coolie is a word that . . . has no established etymology: some place
it from the Tamil kuli (“hire”), others find it in use in sixteenth-
century Portugal as Koli, after the name of a Gujarati community,
still others notice that it sounds like the Chinese ku-li (“bitter la-
bor”) or like the Fijian kuli meaning “dog.” One way or another, to
be called a coolie is to be denigrated, and to be considered at best
as a laborer with no other social markers or desires.1
Introduction
IN RESPONSE TO SUSAN SONTAG’S celebration of English-speak-
ing Indians’ abilities to somehow magically, on their own volition, in-
sert themselves in the global economy as call center workers, Harish
Trivedi coined the term “cyber-coolie.” Indian call center workers,
Trivedi noted, were “cyber-coolies of our global age, working not on
sugar plantations but on flickering screens, and lashed into submis-
sion through vigilant and punitive monitoring, each slip in accent or
lapse in pretence meaning a cut in wages.”2 I use the terms cyber-
coolie and techno-braceros to describe the large numbers of Indian
information technology workers in the United States.3 These techno-
* Sharmila Rudrappa is an associate professor of sociology and is affiliated with the
Center for Asian American Studies and the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the
University of Texas at Austin. Her research and teaching interests are race, gender,
immigration, and labor. She is currently researching the cultural politics of assisted
reproductive technologies in India.
1. VIJAY PRASHAD, EVERYBODY WAS KUNG-FU FIGHTING: AFRO-ASIAN CONNECTIONS AND
THE MYTH OF CULTURAL PURITY 71–72 (2001).
2. Harish Trivedi, Letter to the Editor, Cyber-Coolies, Hindi and English, TIMES LITER-
ARY SUPPLEMENT (London), June 27, 2003, at 17.
3. The term techno-bracero was used by Lawrence Richards, founder of the Software
Professionals’ Political Action Committee, and other critics of the H-1B visa program while
lobbying for immigration reform in 1995. William Branigin, White Collar Visas: Importing
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braceros, like the Mexican braceros and Indian and Chinese coolies
before them, are guest workers in this country, deployed for capital’s
benefit and expunged from the nation when the need dissipates.
The terms techno-bracero and cyber-coolie are used here not in a
derogatory sense, but rather in a descriptive manner. These terms ges-
ture at the legal conditions of work, which partially shape the work
experiences of these high-tech guest workers in the United States. The
terms also elaborate on the anxieties expressed by Max Frisch, who
famously commented on Switzerland’s experience with guest workers:
“It has called for workers, and has been given human beings.”4 Guest
worker programs that bring Mexicans, Chinese, Central Americans, or
Indians into the United States do not want people with their histori-
cal, cultural, and social complexities; instead, the intentions of these
programs are to import, for a short period of time, abstract workers
who are divorced from everything that makes them human. All that is
wanted is their capacity to work—a working body that can be plugged
in and un-problematically unplugged out of production processes,
with no life outside the shop floor.
While cognizant of the fact that racial formations affect Indian
immigrants quite differently than they affect Mexican newcomers, I
still hold on to the terms techno-braceros and cyber-coolies because it
allows me to examine the legal terms of racialized labor incorporation
in the United States. I suggest that the culture of labor can help draw
linkages between these seemingly disparate racial groups and open up
new ways of thinking about racialized labor in the United States.
Foreign labor procurement in the Americas has had racial dimen-
sions from slavery to the present. Examining the rise of multicultural-
ism in the United States, Asian American scholar Lisa Lowe posited
that as a nation-state the United States is concerned with maintaining
a national citizenry bound by race, language, and culture, whereas
capitalism requires only “abstract labor.”5 In a similar vein, this Essay
argues that guest worker programs that bring Chinese, Central Ameri-
cans, or Indians to the United States resolve the tensions around the
importation of foreign workers to serve labor market needs and the
incorporation of these “unassimilables” into the national body. These
Needed Skills or Cheap Labor?, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1995, at A1; see also Ali Mir, Biju Mathew
& Raza Mir, The Codes of Migration: Contours of the Global Software Labor Market, 12 CULTURAL
DYNAMICS 5, 24 (2000) (referring to foreign software workers in the United States as
“techno-braceros” and “techno-coolies”).
4. MAX FRISCH, SKETCHBOOK 1966–1971, at 8 (Geoffrey Skelton trans., Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich 1974) (1971).
5. LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 13 (1996).
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-2\SAN206.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-JAN-10 13:57
Fall 2009] CYBER-COOLIES & TECHNO-BRACEROS 355
programs are structured to render inconsequential much of what
makes workers human; that is, their historical, cultural, and social
complexities. The nation-state balances this importation of labor with
its own need for a homogenous citizenry by focusing on the social
productions of “difference”—of restrictive particularity and illegiti-
macy marked by race, nation, geographical origins, and gender.
Through its policies, the United States has created, preserved, and
reproduced the specifically racialized and gendered character of labor
power.
This Essay examines how guest worker programs in the United
States have pushed non-white workers into commodity status, further
disempowering them, while simultaneously benefiting capital. Part I
reviews guest worker programs in the United States, identifying the
legal similarities between non-white migrant workers, regardless of na-
tional origins. Part II reasons that labor is not inherently a commodity
and examines the processes involved in encouraging workers to sell
their labor. Part III examines the United States nation-state’s role in
pushing non-white guest workers’ labor into commodity form through
its racialized guest worker programs.
I. Labor Procurement and Race
From slavery to the present H-1B Program, foreign labor procure-
ment in the Americas has had racial dimensions. Under slavery, indi-
vidual men and women became property and were bought, sold, and
bartered on the market, their human uniqueness pegged with an ex-
change value. Their uniqueness mattered, but only so far as what and
how much could be harvested from their individual bodies. As politi-
cal theorist Achille Mbembe notes, the slave condition resulted “from
a triple loss: loss of ‘home,’ loss of rights over his or her body, and loss
of political status. This triple loss [was] identical with absolute domi-
nation, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity
altogether).”6
The slave ships that brought Africans to the New World were the
same ships used to bring Asian coolies to the sugar plantations of the
Caribbean.7 Although coolies were not slaves and not treated as goods
to be exchanged on the market, the terms of their recruitment and
employment pushed their labor to purer a commodity status.
6. Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 21 (2003).
7. Lisa Yun & Ricardo Rene Laremont, Chinese Coolies and African Slaves in Cuba,
1847–1874, 4 J. ASIAN AM. STUD. 99, 111–12 (2001).
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While working toward abolishing the transatlantic slave trade, the
British were concomitantly establishing the trafficking of Indian and
Chinese coolies in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basin in destinations
such as Malaysia, East Africa, Cuba, Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica.8
Between 1840 and 1875, nearly a quarter million Chinese were
shipped to the New World as coolie labor,9 and between 1838 and
1917 more than half a million Asian Indians worked as coolie laborers
in the Caribbean.10 While it is popularly believed that coolies replaced
slaves, new research shows that slaves and coolies worked simultane-
ously; coolie imports in Cuba increased after 1847, but concomitantly,
slave imports also increased.11
The next large-scale, systematic importation of workers into the
United States was the Bracero Program that operated from 1942 to
1964.12 The program was a series of agreements between the govern-
ments of Mexico and the United States to bring in temporary guest
workers from Mexico as a means to address the ostensible labor scar-
city in the United States resulting from its World War II mobilization,
and subsequently, the Korean War.13 Through the program, more
than 4.6 million contracts were issued to Mexican workers, with ap-
proximately 400,000 men brought over from Mexico each year.14
8. Id. at 102.
9. Id. at 103.
10. Tayyab Mahmud, Migration, Identity, & the Colonial Encounter, 76 OR. L. REV. 633,
645 (1997).
11. LISA YUN, THE COOLIE SPEAKS: CHINESE INDENTURED LABORERS AND AFRICAN SLAVES
IN CUBA 7 (2008).
12. See RICHARD CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY
4 (1971) (stating there were various governmental authorities for the program until it was
formally authorized in 1951 by the Amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L.
No. 82-78, 65 Stat. 119 (1951)).
13. Id. at 8–9.
14. James Sandos & Harry Cross, National Development and International Labour Migra-
tion: Mexico 1940–1965, 18 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 43, 54 (1983) (“During the life of the Bracero
programme, more than 4.6 million contracts were issued legally to Mexicans to work in the
United States.”). It is estimated that between 350,000 and 450,000 Mexicans worked as
braceros each year. See MIRIAM J. WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS: POLITICS, CLASS, AND WORK IN
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE 57 (1996) (stating the number of braceros coming into the
United States was “as many as 450,000 annually during its peak in the late 1950s”); cf. TONY
PAYAN, THE THREE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER WARS: DRUGS, IMMIGRATION AND HOMELAND SECUR-
ITY 55 (2006) (noting “[i]n 1956, [t]he El Paso-Herald Post wrote, ‘More than 80,000
braceros pass through the El Paso Center annually. They’re part of an army of 350,000 or
more that marches across the border each year to help plant, cultivate, and harvest cotton
and other crops throughout the United States.’” (footnote omitted)).
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While the Bracero Program was still in operation, the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 195215 authorized another guest worker
program, the H-2 Program, which also included agricultural workers.
Whereas the Bracero Program served the American West, workers
under the H-2 Program, primarily from the Caribbean, served sugar
cane plantations in Florida and apple farms in the Northeast.16 The
1943 H-2 Program was modified by the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986,17 which divided the program into the H-2A Program,
which gives temporary work visas to agricultural guest workers, and
the H-2B Program, which targets low-wage non-agricultural workers.18
H-2B workers tend to work in landscaping and construction, as well as
seasonal industries.19
While the guest worker programs implemented up to the mid-
twentieth century tended to be bilateral agreements with specific na-
tion-states, the late twentieth century guest worker programs are open-
ended on the question of national origins. That is, these programs are
not specific arrangements between two nation-states, as was the
Bracero Program in the United States or the Gastarbeiter Program in
Germany.20 Instead, current guest worker programs are open to work-
ers from various regions of the world.21
15. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
16. Philip Martin, Guest Worker Programs for the 21st Century, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for
Immigrations Studies, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2000, at 2; see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT
TO CONG. COMMITTEES, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM CHANGES COULD IM-
PROVE SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS AND BETTER PROTECT WORKERS 19 (1997), available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98020.pdf (“[T]he H-2 program was . . . primarily used by
agricultural employers in the east to contract with Caribbean workers.”).
17. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
18. Id. § 301(a) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (1994)); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO CONG. COMMITTEES, supra note 16, at 19 (discussing the H-2A pro- R
gram in-depth).
19. U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UPDATE, US-
CIS TO ACCEPT NEW H-2B FISCAL YEAR 2009 PETITIONS (2009), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/ (follow “News” tab; then follow “USCIS to Accept New H-2B Fiscal Year
2009 Petitions” hyperlink under “August, 2009”; then follow “Update” hyperlink under
“Related Files”).
20. See Veysel Oezcan, Germany: Immigration in Transition, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., July
2004, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=235 (discussing a se-
ries of bilateral recruitment agreements Germany signed with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Portugal, and then Yugoslavia in the 1960s).
21. See, e.g., Philip Martin, Guest Worker Policies for the 21st Century, 23 NEW COMMUNITY
483, 484–89 (1997) (describing the changes in Germany’s guest worker programs from the
bilateral agreements of the 1950s to the more open regional agreements of the current
programs).
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The H-2 Programs, similar to late twentieth century guest worker
programs in other parts of the world, are open to any non-immigrant
worker, from any part of the world, who will work in the United States
temporarily to fill its labor needs. However, the H-2 Programs have de
facto racial ramifications. While these programs might bring in ski in-
structors and such from Europe, the bulk of the guest workers are
from various parts of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the
Philippines.22
The other guest worker program, causing as much consternation
as the H-2 Program, is the H-1B Program. The precursor to this guest
worker program was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,23
which conferred H-1 visas to temporary foreign workers with excep-
tional abilities who had been sponsored for employment by American
firms.24 By the 1970s, Congress allowed H-1 visa recipients to apply for
permanent positions in the United States, and companies began to
rely on the program more heavily to bring in foreign workers.25 The
Immigration Act of 199026 capped the number of H-1B visas to 65,000
per year, to be awarded to persons with at least a Bachelor’s degree in
a specific specialty.27
Firms could now hire guest workers under the following condi-
tions: (1) there was a shortage of qualified citizen workers; (2) foreign
workers were not displacing citizen workers; and (3) foreigners were
employed on the same terms as American employees.28 Workers re-
ceive visas for up to three years once sponsored by an employer, and
the visas are renewable for another three-year term if the employer
desires.29 Unlike other guest worker programs, however, the H-1B
Program offers its recruitees an advantage; these guest workers can
obtain permanent residency in the United States if sponsored by the
22. See OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMI-
GRATION STATISTICS 84–87 tbl.32.
23. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 101(a)(15)(H) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)
(2006)).
25. Julie Watts, The H-1B Visa: Free Market Solutions for Business and Labor, 20 POPULA-
TION RES. & POL’Y REV. 143, 144 (2001).
26. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.).
27. Id. § 205 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(g)–(i) (1988)).
28. Id. (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988)).
29. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(15)(ii)(b)(1) (2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (2006)
(limiting the term of authorized admission to six years).
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employing firm.30 During this period, the guest worker’s permanent
residency application depends on maintaining a sponsoring em-
ployer; that is, the guest worker is essentially obligated to work for his
sponsor.31
By the end of the 1990s, the number of H-1Bs awarded had in-
creased dramatically. The American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 199832 raised the H-1B visa cap to 115,000 work-
ers for the years 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 for 2001 but then de-
creased the number back to the original 65,000 in 2002.33 Although
the number of available visas was increased during this period, this
was not enough to meet the demand. For example, by March 2000,
the 115,000 visa quota was already reached.34 Under pressure from
industry, the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century
Act of 200035 was passed, which raised the number of temporary
worker visas to 195,000 per year for the years 2001 through 2003.36 In
2003, 231,030 H-1B petitions were filed with the Citizenship and Im-
migration Services for both initial and continuing employment.37 Of
these, 105,314 were approved for first time employment, and 112,026
were approved for continuing employment.38 Since 2004, H-1B visa
30. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-609, § 205(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978,
5020 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(h) (1994)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F)
(2006) (stating an employer desiring and intending to employ an alien qualifying for classi-
fication under section 1153 may petition for the alien’s grant of immigrant status). Em-
ployer sponsorship is the most typical manner in which H-1B visa holders obtain legal
permanent resident status. See Norm Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immi-
grant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 815 (2003).
31. See Matloff, supra note 30, at 864–69 (describing H-1B visa holders’ dependency R
on their employers for permanent residency as de facto indentured servitude).
32. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 411(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–2642 (1998).
33. Id.
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERV., QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS, FISCAL YEAR 2000 H-1B CAP (2000), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/press-
release/FY00H-1BCap_032800.pdf.
35. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-313, § 102, 114 Stat. 1251, 1251 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)
(2000)).
36. Id.
37. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., H-1B PETITIONS FILED AND APPROVED BY
TYPE OF PETITION: FYS 2000–03 (2004), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/press-
release/h1bcap_FS.pdf.
38. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., H-1B PETITIONS RECEIVED AND APPROVED IN
FY 2003 (2003), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/H1-BFY2003.pdf. This adds
up to more than 22,000 visas above the cap because nearly all workers approved for contin-
uing employment are not subject to the Congress mandated cap under the H-1B program
stipulations; hence, the limit of 195,000 was calculated as not having been reached. See id.
(identifying certain classes of workers not included in the H-1B visa cap).
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quotas have gone down to their original 65,000, but politicians face
constant pressure from the industry to push the numbers to higher
levels.
Like other late-twentieth century guest worker programs, the H-
1B Program is not racially specific or single-nation oriented, yet a
large number of these temporary work visas have gone to Indian men.
By the late 1990s, over forty percent of all H1-B visas were issued to
Indian software workers.39 In 1998 and 1999, for example, Indians re-
ceived 47.5% of the H-1B visas, followed by the Chinese at 9.3%.40
Computer-related and engineering occupations accounted for seventy
percent of the H-1B visas, and of these, nearly seventy-four percent of
the systems analysts and programmers were born in India.41 Though
the H-1B Program is not a race-based labor procurement program,
like the H-2 Programs, it has become a de facto racialized program.
The Chinese and Indian coolies of the nineteenth century, the
Mexican braceros of the mid-twentieth century, the Latino/a H-2A
and H-2B workers, and the Indian H-1B techno-braceros were or are
racialized into United States society in radically different ways. How-
ever, their status as guest workers results in labor situations that are
legally analogous. Regardless of the specific details of each labor pro-
curement program, the fact that these individuals are guest workers,
itinerant laborers, and sojourners from the perspective of the law
means they all face similar issues regarding their employers’ capacity
to impose work place discipline and their own ability to exercise any
control over the production process.
II. The Labor Exchange
A. The Fable that Labor Is Commodity
Adam Smith famously claimed that, “the demand for men, like
that of any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of
men.”42 Though individuals agree to work for wages, labor cannot be
classified as a commodity because it is attached to humans who have
complicated social lives, and it gives rise to characteristics unique to
each specific worker. First, labor’s uniqueness lies in the fact it pro-
39. See U.S. IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERV., CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIALTY OCCU-
PATION WORKERS (H-1B), MAY 1998 TO JULY 1999, at 1–2 (1999), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/files/article/report1.pdf.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 2.
42. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 82 (C.J. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776).
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duces goods and individuals.43 Second, it is impossible to divorce la-
bor from its social context. As Jane Collins notes, “[w]henever workers
enter into production, they bring with them their needs for subsis-
tence, the needs of their families, their commitments to affairs outside
the workplace, and their ideas of what is right and fair.”44 Social rules
of interaction, habits, racial valuation, and gendered expectations
shape the employer-worker relationship. Collins notes that, “[l]abor
markets are deeply rooted in local institutions and practices. The la-
bor contract is a social contract, which contains tacit expectations and
is based on trust,”45 where moral economies of the workplace provide
the basis of interactions. Labor markets are “not closed and immuta-
ble systems but open, communicative frameworks susceptible to inno-
vations of many kinds” by both the sellers and buyers of labor power.46
Third, unlike corn, gasoline, or car parts, labor cannot be stored
or its production and reproduction calibrated to suit market
demands.
[T]o confuse labor with true commodities means adopting the fol-
lowing incorrect assumptions: the worker is the same as the objects
of work; production is a purely technical exercise, a system of ma-
chinery that workers do not in any sense direct or contribute to. . . .
The production process is devoid of social relations and social life
that affect worker behaviour . . . [and] children are raised solely for
the purpose of becoming workers for hire . . . .47
Finally, to believe that labor is like any other commodity is to miss
the fact that the sale of labor is a contested social exchange. The labor
contract only guarantees that labor power is sold and does not transfer
the ownership of the worker; that is, the individual worker continues
to own her body. In purchasing labor power, the employer contracts
to pay a wage and the worker agrees to submit to the disciplinary re-
gime of the firm for a given period of time. Work activity is distinct
from the contractual process, and the owner must enlist the worker’s
consent or utilize subtle forms of coercion to harvest her labor power.
43. See generally KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844
(Martin Milligan trans., Int’l Publishers 1964) (1932) (claiming that labor is unlike any
other commodity because it not only produces goods, but also gives rise to human con-
sciousness through exerting oneself against nature and producing things). For a sustained
discussion on the link between human nature and labor, see BRUNO GULLI, LABOR OF FIRE:
THE ONTOLOGY OF LABOR BETWEEN ECONOMY AND CULTURE (2005).
44. JANE L. COLLINS, THREADS: GENDER, LABOR, AND POWER IN THE GLOBAL APPAREL
INDUSTRY 151 (2003).
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id.
47. JAMIE PECK, WORK PLACE: THE SOCIAL REGULATION OF LABOR MARKETS 25 (1996)
(internal citations omitted).
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Thus, the work process is a continually negotiated process, with the
worker seeking to exercise autonomy over the pace of, or manner in
which, work is conducted. On the other hand, it is in the employer’s
interest to control labor so that they may retain full control over the
production process. This results in a continually contested labor
“exchange.”
Conditions of endogenous enforcement exist in most exchanges
of a capitalist economy. Such exchanges “give rise to a well-defined set
of power-relations among voluntarily participating agents even in the
absence of collusion or other obstacles to perfect competition.”48 The
endogenous conditions in labor exchanges are that employers have
far greater power than do workers, because the latter can threaten the
former with demotion, or worse, with being laid off.
Hence, because of these reasons, labor is a fictive commodity; it
“is only another name for human activity which goes with life itself . . .
[it] is not produced for sale . . . .”49
B. Negotiating the Labor Exchange
Labor exchanges are often believed to be a relationship solely
between an employer who buys labor and a worker who sells her la-
bor. Yet, this exchange is mediated by much more. Labor market the-
orists show us that these markets are socio-political constructions that
require a state’s active involvement in facilitating the creation of sup-
ply, demand, surplus, and scarcity of labor within its boundaries. As a
result policies are enacted to support a worker’s entry into the market-
place and to keep the worker in the workplace. Scholar Jamie Peck
explains there are four processes involved in getting individuals to be-
come willing participants in a labor market: (1) the incorporation of
individuals into the labor market; (2) the allocation of individuals to
various jobs; (3) the imperative for controlling workers so that their
labor may be harvested efficiently; and (4) the reproduction of a work
force that can replenish the labor market.50
1. Incorporating Labor
A common understanding is that individuals enter the labor mar-
ket to sell their labor because they need jobs, and someone will buy
48. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the
Political Economy of Capitalism, 18 POL. & SOC’Y 165, 167 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
49. KARL POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORI-
GINS OF OUR TIME 75 (2d ed. 2001).
50. PECK, supra note 47, at 24–40. R
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their labor at a fair price. But, “contrary to the canons of neoclassical
economics, the labor supply is not simply regulated by the market, but
instead is shaped by relatively autonomous social forces such as state
policies, ideological norms, and family structures.”51 People need to
feel the urge to work. Along with economic necessity, the desire to
engage in waged work is shaped by socialization processes; that is, no-
tions of masculinity regarding breadwinner status and pride in partic-
ular kinds of jobs. To be an adult (especially a man) and not be
employed is often deemed shameful.52
State policies also play a crucial role in incorporating individuals
into the labor market. The withdrawal or provision of childcare, voca-
tional training, and educational subsidies show the vested interest
states have in their citizens becoming productive workers. In addition
to incorporating individuals into the labor market, the state also
shapes the conditions under which individuals enter the labor market.
Wage structures, working conditions, and workers’ rights are not
driven solely by the market; instead, they are shaped by state policies
and laws. States regulate the conditions under which citizens and non-
citizens are incorporated into the labor market.
2. Allocating Labor
The second aspect to structuring labor markets is the allocation
of particular workers into particular jobs. This too is a sociological
process; for example, women tend to work in feminized jobs, such as
nursing and childcare, while men tend to work in masculinized jobs,
such as truck driving and the construction industry. A persons’ actual
characteristics, such as training or experience, do not dictate their dis-
tribution in jobs; rather, employment is often determined by their at-
tributed or ascribed characteristics, such as gender or race. Society
deems young mothers, students, and older workers, for example, as
having a weaker attachment to the labor market. That is, they are seen
as opting out of jobs because young children, schoolwork, or health
51. Id. at 27.
52. Political theorist Judith Shklar writes:
To be a recognized and active citizen at all [a person] must be an equal member
of the polity, a voter, but he must also be . . . an “earner,” a free remunerated
worker, one who is rewarded for the actual work he has done, neither more nor
less. He cannot be a slave or an aristocrat.
JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 64 (1991). These ideal
citizens have historically tended to be working white men, who entered into the market as
independent sellers of labor power. The loss of employment is seen as loss of social posi-
tion that “is itself felt as a loss of competency, which is inevitably enhanced when the unem-
ployed person must seek help from others.” Id. at 94.
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issues compel them to quit. The belief is that their lifestyle demands
are such that they have tenuous ties to their jobs, therefore resulting
in their devaluation in the labor market. Ascribed characteristics of
certain individuals automatically put them at a disadvantage in the
labor market.53 Irrespective of individual abilities, “members of these
groups are treated by employers, unions, and state agencies alike as if
they have a weak attachment to the labor market.”54
3. Controlling Labor
The extraction of labor power from the worker on the shop floor
is a contested exchange marked by unequal power relations. In order
to realize their workers’ capacity to work, employers must either subtly
coerce or garner the consent of their workers. Thus, production on
the shop floor is a political process rather than a simple exchange of
wages for labor power. It is in the employers’ interests to hire compli-
ant workers who consent to work discipline. Suitable workers are not
simply those who have the right skill set, but are also those who display
good worker attributes such “as reliability, creativity, sociability, initia-
tive, deference to authority, and adaptability. These traits, and their
unpredictability, follow from the fact that labor is not a commodity
but a set of capacities borne by people.”55 Employers can never know
workers’ attributes beforehand, so they attempt to minimize risk by
looking for indicators in potential workers that signal such character-
istics. Indicators might be class status (that is, the belief that middle
class workers might be more compliant), immigration status, or gen-
der (as evinced by sweat shops that hire only women).
4. Reproducing Labor
Finally, labor markets need to be replenished with new workers.
This involves not only biological procreation and caring for children,
but also educating, training, developing skill sets, and nurturing ideo-
53. An example of such ascription is the notion that highly educated, high-achieving
women in the present-day United States are quitting careers to follow the “mommy track.”
The prevailing belief is that these women find motherhood so much more fulfilling than
jobs, and therefore have weaker attachments to their workplace than do their male col-
leagues. Contradicting such popular beliefs, sociologist Pamela Stone argues that women
do not necessarily opt out of the labor market; instead, they are being pushed out as they
find themselves marginalized in the work place, or their jobs are structured in such a way
that their gendered responsibilities as mothers are not accommodated. PAMELA STONE,
OPTING OUT: WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME 18–19 (2007).
54. PECK, supra note 47, at 31. R
55. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
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logical orientations in individuals, all of which are anchored in fami-
lies, neighborhoods, and nation-states. The state incurs costs in
reproducing labor, which can run especially high both in economic
and political terms when potential workers cannot be incorporated
into the labor market.56
Thus, for all these reasons—the challenges inherent in incorpo-
rating, allocating, controlling, and reproducing labor—the notion of
a self-regulating, economically-driven labor market is a myth, argues
Peck.57 States face the constant challenge of regulating labor markets;
“state intervention in the labor market is perhaps best characterized as
a continuous process of regulatory experimentation and learning,” in-
volving legislative or institutional reform, welfare, or training policy.58
The convergence of labor and labor markets to pure commodity
form does not occur automatically; instead, labor markets are socio-
political constructions, with states actively facilitating the creation of
supply, demand, surplus, and scarcity within national boundaries.59
The state, through various policies and laws, attempts to regulate the
supply of labor and deems the very sociality of labor processes as sec-
ondary to production needs. State processes regarding immigration,
workers’ rights, access to citizenship, and processes of racialization all
push the labor of certain individuals into resembling purer commod-
ity forms. One very effective way by which states attempt to regulate
labor markets is through racialized guest worker programs.
56. Workers who cannot be incorporated need to be supported either through house-
holds (which presumes other members have adequate employment), or unemployment
benefits and other forms of social welfare (which are costly for the state). See, e.g., DIV. OF
FISCAL AND ACTUARIAL SERVS., OFF. OF WORKFORCE SEC., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OUT-
LOOK, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 2 (2009), available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/
unemploy/pdf/prez_budget.pdf (estimating the total amount paid in unemployment ben-
efits for all programs to be $102.9 billion). Additionally, job losses also result in citizens’
disenchantment with the state. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Lori Montgomery & Michael A.
Fletcher, White House Faces Pressure on Jobs: Despite Stimulus Successes, More Action Sought,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2009, at A1 (noting political analysts claim Democrats may lose control
of the lower house if they fail to develop an effective plan for creating jobs).
57. PECK, supra note 47, at 16. R
58. Id. at 42–43.
59. Another way by which states control labor is through policies that instill rules re-
garding “quality control” over the production of labor. To attract global capital, regional
governments provide tax breaks, subsidize the factors of production, and crucially, ease up
labor regulations and welfare policies that were central to social reproduction. These poli-
cies also contribute to the increasing commodification of labor, but their discussion is
outside the scope of this Essay.
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III. Regulating Labor Markets Through Guest Worker
Programs
The incorporation, allocation, control, and reproduction of
workers can be more finely manipulated by the state through bringing
in foreigners—almost always racial others—to work in front of com-
puter screens, on agricultural fields, and on construction sites for a
stipulated period of time. Because guest workers can be brought in
when states face rapid economic expansion and have labor
“shortages” or sent out of the country during economic downturns,
guest workers are very much like corn, gasoline, and car parts. That is,
they can be deployed in the market much like goods. Work visas and
permits can be increased or decreased, carefully calculated to suit
market demands and political expediencies.
Ostensibly, American citizen workers are protected by guest
worker legislation. For example, the Bracero Program limited the hir-
ing of braceros only to areas where there was an officially recognized
shortage of domestic farm workers, or when braceros did not ad-
versely affect the wages and working conditions of citizen workers.60
Similarly, the H-1B Program stipulates that firms can hire techno-
braceros only if there is a shortage of qualified Americans and these
itinerant workers are employed on the same terms as citizens.61 How-
ever, the concept of a labor shortage is a political construct. While
employers often claim a labor shortage exists, labor organizations em-
phasize that labor is available. There seems to be a shortage in work-
ers, labor advocates note, only because citizen workers may not be
willing to work on the terms employers offer; thus, employers deem
these workers “unavailable.”62 One way to get suitable workers, who
60. Amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 82-78, § 503, 65 Stat. 119.
In addition, employers had to first attempt to hire Americans, and if they did not find any
who would work at the wages and hours offered to Mexicans, then they could import
braceros. Id.
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2006).
62. See, e.g., Moira Herbst, Labor Shortages: Myth and Reality, BUS. WEEK, Aug. 21, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2007/db20070821_451283.
htm (quoting Kim Berry, the president of the Programmers Guild, “We don’t believe that
there is a labor shortage. . . . [Y]ou’ll attract the best and brightest [U.S. workers] if the
price is right.”); William J. Holstein, Give Us Your Wired, Your Highly Skilled, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1998, at 53 (citing claims by the labor group Communications Work-
ers of America that telecom companies had laid off 142,000 workers in 1998, yet the com-
panies complained they could not find enough workers); Aaron Zitner, Foreign Worker Bill
Approved, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998, at C1 (reporting that, during the high-tech boom,
labor groups opposed any increases in visas because employers could draw more American
workers if they simply raised wages).
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are willing to work on an employer’s terms, labor advocates argue, is
to import them from poorer nations where standards of living are
lower, and the costs associated with everyday life are lower.63
The contested nature of labor “shortages” was apparent in the
American information technology industry in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Firms complained to politicians that they did not have enough
workers and that the H-1B Program had to be expanded to bring in
more foreign workers.64 However, labor and professional organiza-
tions maintained that there was no shortage of high-tech workers in
the United States.65 Nevertheless, as discussed supra Part I, the legisla-
ture increased the influx of foreign workers by expanding the H-1B
Program.
The expansion of guest worker programs may have several devas-
tating effects for citizen and non-citizen workers. First, guest worker
programs can be used to discipline citizen workers. The Bracero Pro-
63. See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell & Julie Pitta, “Brain Gain” or Threat to U.S. Jobs?, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 1996, at A1 (reporting critics of visa expansion, including labor groups,
viewed employers’ lobbying efforts to increase the H-1B visa program as a strategy to ex-
ploit “foreign help and hire a relatively cheap, readily available and easily discardable work
force . . .”); Julia Preston, White House Moves to Ease Guest Worker Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2008, at A22 (citing the concerns of farm worker advocates regarding proposed changes to
the H-2A guest worker program, “We’re concerned this proposal will allow thousands of
agricultural employees to bring in cheap foreign labor from poor countries and under-
mine the standards of farm workers in this country . . .”).
64. See, e.g., Holstein, supra note 62 (citing the claims of high-tech industry employers R
in 1998 that nearly 400,000 tech jobs were going vacant as a result of the labor shortage);
Zitner, supra note 62 (reporting on the high-tech industry’s lobbying of Congress for ex- R
pansion of the H-1B visa program in response to the claimed labor shortage in the high-
tech industry in 1998). More recently, Bill Gates argued the current limit of 65,000 H-1B
visas had led to disruptions in the flow of talented science, technology, engineering, and
math graduates to American companies. See Jim Abrams, Bill Gates Presses for More Work
Visas, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/ar-
ticles/2008/03/13/bill_gates_presses_for_more_work_visas/. Microsoft and other firms
had apparently been compelled to locate staff in countries, notably Canada, that were
open to skilled foreign workers. Id. In 2007, Microsoft was unable to obtain H-1B visas for
one-third of the qualified foreign-born job candidates it wanted to hire. Id. It wanted these
non-citizen candidates because the firm believed there were no qualified citizen workers
available. Id.
65. See Holstein, supra note 62; Zitner, supra note 62; see also Matloff, supra note 30, at R
823 (stating the United States affiliate of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engi-
neers publicly criticized the information technology industry’s claims of a labor shortage in
the late 1990s). In addition, in more recent years, job losses in the high-tech industry were
high even when the nation was experiencing an economic recovery. Between March 2001
and March 2004, the IT industry eliminated approximately 402,800 jobs, more than half of
which were shed during a time when the nation was officially experiencing an economic
recovery, starting in November 2001. SNIGDHA SRIVASTAVA & NIK THEODORE, CTR. FOR UR-
BAN ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LABOR MARKETS: RE-
BOUNDING, BUT SLOWLY 1 (2006).
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gram, scholars have noted, was used to break the American Federa-
tion of Labor affiliated National Farm Labor Union’s (“NFLU”)
efforts at unionizing workers in California’s agricultural sector.66 In
two major instances, the DiGiorgio and the Imperial Valley strikes of
1948 and 1951, braceros were used to replace striking workers and
undermine the impacts of the strikes.67 The NFLU attempted to use a
citizen’s arrest to enforce statutes on employers, but local courts ruled
against them, and the Immigration and Naturalization Services re-
fused to remove braceros from the fields, as had been stipulated
under legislation.68 Thus, guest worker programs can be used to break
citizen workers’ unionizing efforts.
Second, the costs of labor production—such as education, the
development of skills, and reproduction—are borne by the sending
nations such as Mexico, Turkey, and India. The United States bears
no expenses for the training of these workers. Third, countries such as
the United States that receive guest workers do not need to provide
unemployment benefits for these non-citizen workers. Guest workers
can be sent back to their countries if they lose their jobs due to eco-
nomic downturns (as in the construction industry), the seasonal na-
ture of work (as in agriculture), or project-driven cycles of work (as in
the case of information technology jobs). For example, if an informa-
tion technology guest worker loses her job, she legally only has ten
days to find another job and H-1B visa sponsor; if she is unable to do
so, then she becomes an “illegal alien.”69 For the nation-state using
66. J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements
(1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249, 356 (1977).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11) (2009) (stating an employer must notify the director
who approved the H-1B petition if there is a change in employment and that termination
of employment is grounds for revocation of the petition); id. § 214.2(h)(13)(i)(A) (declar-
ing the visa beneficiary has ten days to remain in the United States after the validity period
of the visa ends). The current downturn in the economy has led to a mad scramble for jobs
and new employers among non-citizen workers on H-1B visas. See Lornet Turnbull, Down-
turn Dilemma: Foreign Professionals and Worker Visas, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, http://
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008746256_h1bvisas15m0.html (noting that
with soaring joblessness, employers are under pressure to cut their foreign work force
first). Turnbull reports on the dire implications of job loss:
The implications of job loss are even more dire for those on their way to ob-
taining permanent residency—a natural transition from the H-1B. After waiting
many years for a green card to become available, some who can’t find a new job
may have to scrap it all and go home. For many, that means unearthing deep
roots. “They are integrated into the economy,” said Robert Foley, a Seattle immi-
gration attorney. “They have spouses here, kids in school. They bought homes
here. All of a sudden they are out of a job, and all of that is at risk.”
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guest workers, the economic and political expense of maintaining an
unemployed work force is eliminated. The costs of maintaining non-
productive workers are exported out of the country. Simultaneously,
the political costs of maintaining an unemployed workforce are ex-
ported out. The labor of these foreign workers reaches purer com-
modity form because its supply is regulated by the receiving nation-
state through immigration laws. By stipulating the length of stay and
limiting citizenship rights, receiving nations can effectively disregard
the social lives of these workers by transferring them out and replac-
ing them with new foreign workers when needed.
Fourth, it is in the interest of an employer to hire compliant
workers,70 and guest worker programs condition arriving foreigners to
be compliant workers. For guest workers, the renewal of labor con-
tracts is dependent on employer goodwill. If their employers are dis-
pleased with them, not only do they risk losing their jobs, but they
may also be forced to leave the country. As a result, workers are less
likely to complain about low wages and less than ideal work conditions
because they have an interest in maintaining their contracts and legal
status in the United States. They are also less likely to unionize. Thus,
their status as guest workers minimizes the risks for employers be-
cause, along with the appropriate skills, guest workers display the
much admired worker attributes of compliance with authority and
adaptability to long hours or lower wages.
Concededly, this situation is quite similar to what most workers in
the American economy face, regardless of their citizenship or resi-
dency status. However, this problem is exacerbated for foreign guest
workers because the state facilitates their deeper disempowerment by
denying them the rights associated with citizenship.71 If they are over-
worked or underpaid, they are unable to leave because the law binds
them to the company that sponsored their employment. In addition,
if these workers are fired, they potentially lose their legal status in the
United States and become “illegals” since guest workers have a limited
period of time to find another job and an employer to sponsor their
work permit.72
The one advantage techno-braceros/cyber-coolies have over
other guest workers is their potential to convert their guest worker
Id.
70. See supra Part II.B.3.
71. The citizenship rights of the U.S. Constitution are guaranteed only to citizens—
“persons born or naturalized in the United States. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. See supra note 69. R
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status into permanent residency. That is, American citizenship is
within their reach.73 However, permanent residency is available only if
their employer sponsors their paperwork. Some cyber-coolies/techno-
braceros continue working for the same employer, even if working
conditions are less than ideal, because they hope their employer will
sponsor their permanent residency. Switching to more favorable jobs
can delay the residency application process, leaving the foreign work-
ers vulnerable to employer goodwill for a much longer period.74
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that sections 201 and 202
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) set limits on the num-
ber of permanent residencies.75 There is a limit on the number of
people who can be granted permanent residence status in any given
year. This quota is calculated on two things: the employment-based
category or the family-based category, and the per country limits;
which means that every country, regardless of how large or small it is,
is given the same percent of the worldwide quota.76 As a result, coun-
tries like China and India with large populations are subject to longer
waiting times than a person born in Germany or Austria. For the year
2009, the family-sponsored preference limit was set at 226,000, and
the employment-based preference limit was at least 140,000.77 Section
202 of the INA prescribes that the per-country limit for preference
immigrants is set at seven percent, which is 25,620 overall, and allots
9800 slots for employment-based immigration.78 Thus, Indian H-1B
workers are at a disadvantage.
73. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. R
74. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. Section 105 of the American Com- R
petitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 increased the portability of H-1B visa
holders in the last stages of the permanent residency application process by providing au-
thorization “to accept new employment upon the filing of the prospective employer of a
new petition on behalf of such nonimmigrant. . . . Employment authorization shall con-
tinue for such alien until the new petition is adjudicated. If the new petition is denied,
such authorization shall cease.” American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 105, 114 Stat. 1251, 1253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(n)(1) (2006)). Although this may, in theory, somewhat ease the permanent resi-
dency process for H-1B visa holders, “the process still takes several years, during which the
H-B1 still remains ‘loyal’ to the employer.” Matloff, supra note 30, at 868. R
75. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §§ 201–202, 66
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1152 (2006)). The Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 101–102, 104 Stat. 4980–85 (current versions at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151–1152 (2006)), significantly amended the calculations of these quotas.
76. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1152 (2006).
77. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN OCTOBER 2009, http://travel.state.gov/
visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_4575.html?css.
78. See id. A minimum of 140,000 employee applicants (not family-based) are awarded
permanent residency every year. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d)(1)(A) (2006). Each country is
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Indians are overrepresented in the H-1B visa category because, as
discussed supra Part I, they have consistently received the largest num-
ber of these work visas since the program was initiated. Simultane-
ously, and this is partially because of their overrepresentation as guest
workers, citizenship is less accessible to them because of retrogres-
sion.79 Even when employers want to sponsor their permanent resi-
dency, Indians (along with mainland-born Chinese, Mexicans, and
Filipinos/as) have much longer waits because their “green card”
quota might already be filled.
The state presumes that employers act in good faith; that they
would never overwork or otherwise exploit guest workers. In contrast,
guest workers are suspected of arbitrarily switching jobs, or exploiting
employers to gain access into the United States. Guest workers are not
allowed to move jobs without also losing access to permanent resi-
dency and, concomitantly, more secure worker rights. Thus, guest
workers are probationary Americans.80 Through its immigration laws
the American state pushes workers into commodity status, further dis-
empowering them while simultaneously benefiting capital.
Conclusion
Theoretically, in a racially homogenous nation, the needs of capi-
tal and the needs of the state complement each other. Yet in a racially
differentiated state such as the United States, capital and state impera-
tives may be contradictory. Capital, with its needs for ostensibly “ab-
stract” labor, is said by Marx to be unconcerned by the “origins” of its
given a seven percent quota, resulting in 9800 slots for permanent residency. These 9800
slots are further divided into employment-based categories: (1) priority workers, who are
persons with extraordinary abilities—very few workers qualify for this category, and thus
this particular quota (approximately 2800) never fills up; (2) professionals with advanced
degrees or exceptional abilities; (3) skilled workers, the quota for which almost always fills
up; (4) certain special immigrants; and (5) employment creation, or investors in a targeted
rural or high unemployment area. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2006). Oversubscribed countries
such as India and China have an overabundance of workers in the third category. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 77 (charting the oversubscription of India and China in R
the third category).
79. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, VISA AVAILABILITY & PRIORITY DATES
(2009), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (search “visa retrogression”; then follow
“Visa Availability & Priority Dates” hyperlink) (Visa retrogression “occurs when more peo-
ple apply for a visa in a particular category than there are visas available for that month.
Visa retrogression most often occurs when the annual limit has been reached.”).
80. See generally EDWARD J.W. PARK & JOHN S.W. PARK, PROBATIONARY AMERICANS: CON-
TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE SHAPING OF ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
(2005) (examining guest workers within the framework of American immigration policy
and dubbing these guest workers “probationary Americans”).
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labor force. Contrarily, the nation-state needs an “abstract citizen,”
who has a specific form of culture. Thus, a nation-state’s concern is “to
maintain a national citizenry bound by race, language, and culture.”81
The liberal American state is built on two foundational ideals: in-
dividual freedom and political equality. Individual freedom ensures
that citizens exercise their autonomy by purchasing commodities and
selling their labor on terms that they are free to set. Political equality
is ostensibly achieved through exercising the political rights associated
with citizenship, such as voting and standing for office. Guest work-
ers—coolies, braceros, and cyber-coolies—do not have access to indi-
vidual freedom and political equality. As guest workers, they are
unable to set the terms of employment. If unhappy with their work,
they can leave their place of employment, but they must also leave the
United States. Thus, they have no freedom. And they have no political
equality because, as temporary workers, they cannot access citizenship
rights.
The situation of these guest workers is illustrative of American
liberalism. Asian American scholar Lisa Lowe eloquently argues:
[I]n the history of the United States, capital has maximized its
profits not through rendering labor “abstract” but precisely
through the social productions of “difference,” of restrictive partic-
ularity and illegitimacy marked by race, nation, geographical ori-
gins, and gender. The law of value has operated, instead, by
creating, preserving, and reproducing the specifically racialized
and gendered character of labor power.82
Guest worker programs resolve the tensions the American state faces
in nation-building. The needs of capital drive the demand for labor,
pulling in non-white workers from various parts of the world, but the
nation is built on the abstract citizen—a white (male) person. Al-
though the needs of the nation and the needs of capital are diametri-
cally opposed, these contradictory needs are resolved through guest
worker programs. These programs keep labor transaction costs low,
but, by denying non-white workers citizenship, also expunge guest
workers from the national body. As “guests,” non-white workers are
seen solely as value-adding, labor-bearing bodies to be deployed when
needed for capital’s benefit. Their human qualities and concrete so-
cial lives matter little; they are seen as inherently non-existent.
81. LOWE, supra note 5, at 13. R
82. Id. at 27–28.
